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THE NATURAL LAW DUE PROCESS
PHILOSOPHYO
Robert P. George
I am grateful to Joseph Koterski and James Fleming for their
comments on my paper. Father Koterski and I agree more than we
disagree. Things are the other way with Professor Fleming, so I will
devote this response to his comments (though I will not address every
point on which we disagree).
The terms "natural law" and "legal positivism" have no stable
meaning in contemporary legal, political, and philosophical discourse.
It is therefore incumbent upon scholars who participate in discussions
in which these terms are employed to attend carefully to the different
meanings assigned to them by different writers or by a given writer in
different contexts. The price of carelessness in this regard is error and
confusion.
Unfortunately, James Fleming's comment on my paper
demonstrates my point. Fleming imagines that there is a striking
"anomaly" in my "embracing" Hugo Black's "harangue" against
natural law.1 "I can certainly understand," Fleming avers, "why a
positivist like Robert Bork would revel in Black's trashing of natural
law. I never thought, however, I would see the day when an able
defender of natural law [that would be me] would embrace Black's
dissent [in Griswold v. Connecticut]."2 "Notwithstanding George," he
goes on, "one might expect most natural lawyers to defend the dignity
and honor of natural law against Black's critique [of it]."Anyone who pauses, however, to consider what Hugo Black was
rejecting when he condemned "the natural law due process
philosophy" of judging (or what Robert Bork is affirming when he
accepts the label "legal positivist") vill see that Fleming is deeply
mistaken. The anomaly he thinks he finds in my analysis is an illusion
generated by his failure to observe that the "natural law due process
philosophy" that Black rejects has no necessary connection to the
* This is Professor George's Response to Professor James E. Fleming, Fidelity to
NaturalLaw and NaturalRights in Constitutional Interpretation.69 Fordham L. Rev.

2285 (2001).
1. James E. Fleming, Fidelity to NaturalLaw and NaturalRights in Constitutional
Interpretation,69 Fordham L. Rev. 2285, 2285 (2001).
2. Id. at 2286.
3. Id. at 2287.
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"natural law" I affirm. Indeed, no proposition central to Black's
criticism of the opinion for the Court in Griswold contradicts any
proposition I hold or have asserted in defending natural law.
In Natural Law and Natural Rights-the 1980 book that revived
interest in natural law theory among contemporary legal philosophers
in the analytic tradition-John Finnis elaborated an argument to show
that "[t]here are human goods that can be secured only through the
institutions of human law, and requirements of practical
reasonableness that only those institutions can satisfy."4 It is this
proposition that I join Finnis and a number of other contemporary
natural law theorists in defending against moral skeptics and
relativists, as well as those particular "legal positivists," such as Hans
Kelsen,5 who make the rejection of the objectivity of human goods
and moral requirements integral to their jurisprudential theories.
Plainly Robert Bork is not a legal positivist of the Kelsenian stripe.
His "positivism" is expressly restricted to the claim that under our
Constitution courts are entitled to enforce only the positive law of the
Constitution and are obligated to defer to legislative judgments where
the positive law does not forbid legislative action. 6 It is simply a
mistake to imagine him "reveling" in a "trashing" (to use Fleming's
deeply pejorative term) of the "natural law" that Finnis and I defend.
What about Hugo Black? "According to Justice Black," Fleming
asserts, "it is specious to maintain that the Constitution incorporates
natural law."7 I do not think that Fleming has any basis for drawing
this interpretative conclusion. In condemning "the natural law due
process philosophy" of judging, Black rejects the idea that judges have
been given authority by the Constitution to enforce natural law
principles that have not been incorporatedinto the constitutional text.
But nowhere in his Griswold dissent-the sole authority cited by
Fleming for his interpretation of Black in this matter-does Black
deny that the text incorporatesnaturallaw principles as the framers and
ratifiers understood them. Nor does he deny that when judges
properly enforce certain constitutional guarantees they are enforcing
the Constitution's understanding of natural law and natural rights.
4. John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 3 (1980).
5. See Hans Kelsen, The Natural-LawDoctrine Before the Tribunal of Science, in
What is Justice? Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science: Collected Essays
by Hans Kelsen 137, 141 (1957). I criticize Kelsen's thought in Kelsen and Aquinas on
'the Natural-Law Doctrine,'75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1625 (2000).
6. "I am far from denying that there is a natural law, but I do deny both that we
have given judges the authority to enforce it and that judges have any greater access
to that law than do the rest of us." Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The
Political Seduction of the Law 66 (1990). Of course, my own view is that in enforcing
the positive law of the Constitution, judges in many cases will be carrying out one of
the Constitution's strategies for giving effect to principles of natural law and natural
rights. I would be surprised if Bork disagreed, though I do not propose to put words
in his mouth.
7. Fleming, supra note 1, at 2286.
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Nothing in what Black says contradicts my claim that the framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution sought to craft a Constitution that would,
as I said in my paper, "conform to [natural law's] requirements, as
they understood them, and embody its basic principles for the design
of a just political order."8
I do not know what Hugo Black's views were on fundamental
metaethical questions, or whether he ever revealed them. Perhaps he
was inclined towards some form of metaethical skepticism. There are
certainly notable jurists who have been so inclined- begin the list with
Kelsen, or even before Kelsen, with Black's influential predecessor on
the Supreme Court of the United States, Oliver Wendell Holmes.
Indeed, metaethical skepticism might have been the (misguided)
subjective basis of Black's rejection of "the natural law due process
philosophy."'" It is possible to interpret references to "subjective
considerations of 'natural justice... or "any mysterious and uncertain
natural law concept" in Black's Griswold dissent" as suggesting
metaethical skepticism, though, read in context, one certainly need
not interpret them in that way. In that dissent, Black was concerned
with the specific question of the scope of judicial authority to enforce
principles of natural law not fairly discoverable in the text. I would be
reluctant to try to infer from the limited data provided in that context
anything very strong about his more general philosophical opinions.' 2
Whatever Black's views were on metaethical questions, the key
point is that one need not be a metaethical skeptic-one need not
reject "natural law" in Finnis' sense and mine-to recognize the force
of Black's critique of William 0. Douglas' claim in Griswold to have
divined a right to contraception in "penumbras formed by
emanations" of constitutional guarantees that have nothing to do with
any alleged right to be free from the legal enforcement of traditional
norms of sexual morality. 3 Indeed, someone who accepts "natural
8. Robert P. George, NaturalLaw, the Constitution, and the Theory and Practice
of Judicial Review, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 2269, 269 (2001) [hereinafter George.
NaturalLaw].
9. See Richard Posner, The Essential Holmes 116 (1992) (-[V]alues are simply

generalizations emotionally expressed.").
10. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507-27 (1965)

(Black, J.,

dissenting).
11. Id.
12. I set forth my defense of natural law against the skeptical critique in Robert P.
George, A Defense of the New Natural Law Theory, 41 Am. J. Juris. 47 (1996),
reprinted with corrections of multiple printer'serrorsin Robert P. George, In Defense
of Natural Law 18-33 (1999).
13. Please note, however, that my willingness to acknowledge the force of Black's
critique of the majority opinion in Grisiwold should not be interpreted as a wholesale
endorsement of Black's constitutional jurisprudence, any more than it is an
endorsement of his metaethical views, whatever they were. While I believe there is
more to be said for Black's dissent in Griswold than Fleming allows, there are many
points of constitutional law and theory on which I disagree with Black -in some cases
profoundly.

2304

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

law" in Finnis' sense and mine can without logical inconsistency reject
what Black denounced as "the natural law due process philosophy" of
judging-that is, the idea that judges are empowered as a matter of
natural law, to invalidate legislation as "unconstitutional" even where
that legislation does not violate any norm fairly discoverable in the
constitutional text, or, I would add, its structure, logic, or original
understanding, on the basis of the judges' personal-and, in that
sense, one might say (without suggesting anything about their
metaethical status) "subjective"-beliefs about natural law and
natural rights.
As I argued in my paper, the issue of the scope and limits of judicial
power is not resolved by natural law; it is settled, rather, by the
positive law of the Constitution. And, entirely compatibly with the
requirements of natural law, it may reasonably be settled differently,
by way of different constitutional arrangements, in different societies.
There is nothing in principle unjust or otherwise immoral about a
constitution that vests a significant measure of law-making authority
in courts as a check on legislative power; but there is nothing unjust or
otherwise immoral about a constitution that does not confer upon
courts even a limited power of judicial review. Among the things
natural law requires of judges and other officials of a basically just
regime is that they respect the limits of their own authority under the
Constitution, whatever those limits are, and avoid usurping authority
settled by the Constitution on others.
James Fleming is a thoughtful and careful scholar. I am therefore
extremely reluctant to attribute to him the simple-minded mistake of
supposing that every natural law theorist should have an interest in
defending just anything that someone chooses to label "natural law."
Perhaps he believes that Black's rejection of "the natural law due
process philosophy" necessarily presupposes or entails metaethical
skepticism. If in fact this is what Fleming believes, I can't imagine
what his reason is for believing it. He does not challenge the
fundamental point of my article, namely, that the natural law itself
confers no authority on judges to go beyond the text, logic, structure,
or original understanding of the Constitution to enforce principles of
natural justice as they understand them. If and when judges possess
such authority, they possess it, not as a matter of natural law, but,
rather, as a power conferred upon them by the Constitution. But that
means that the natural law does not itself demand, though neither
does it preclude, what Black referred to as "the natural law due
process philosophy" of judging. It all depends on whether this or that
particular constitution-the Constitution of the United States, for
example-in fact empowers judges to enforce their understandings of
natural justice, and to displace the contrary understandings of the
people's elected representatives in legislatures, even in the absence of
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a warrant provided by the constitutional text, its stncture, logic, or
originalunderstanding.
Fleming rightly says that I "report" my conclusions about the scope
and limits of judicial power under the Constitution of the United
States, rather than argue for them. As he knows, that is because my
paper is not about that question. It is about the question whether
natural law itself licenses free wheeling judicial review of the sort
exemplified by Griswold. It does not. Does it forbid free wheeling
judicial review? Not in principle. Such review violates natural law
when (and only when) it constitutes a usurpation under the positive
law of a given constitution. Judges, being human (particularly when
they are exercising power that is itself not in practice subject to formal
review by other officials), will naturally be tempted to engage in
usurpative acts for the sake of causes they favor, whether these causes
are liberal or conservative, whether they have to do with
contraception, abortion, campaign finance, affirmative action, the
death penalty, laissez faire economics, socialist economics, the election
of George Bush, or the election of Al Gore. For the sake of the rule
of law, a conscientious and responsible judge will resist the
temptation. A proper "judicial restraint" consists precisely in such
personal judicial self-discipline. In a basically just regime, judicial
usurpations of constitutionally established popular or legislative
authority, even in what judges take to be good causes, are themselves
unjust. The willingness to do injustice-even for the sake of ends one
believes, perhaps rightly, to be just-is what I referred to at the end of
my paper as a "bargain with the devil."' 4
Fleming says that "no one proposes breaking with fidelity to the
Constitution (as they understand it) in order to achieve the results
that they desire."' 15 Yet Fleming's own approach to constitutional
interpretation, one he substantially shares with liberal legal theorist
Ronald Dworkin, is one that, according to Dworkin himself,
"would ... be revolutionary for a judge openly to recognize."16
Although liberal (and, Dworkin supposes, conservative) judges
frequently put into practice what he approvingly calls "the moral
reading" of the Constitution (a reading that corresponds roughly to
what Black labeled "the natural law due process philosophy"),
Dworkin admits that "against all the evidence, they deny its influence
and try to explain their decisions in other-embarrassingly
unsatisfactory-ways."1 7 I certainly agree with Dworkin on this point.
In fact, I do not see how it can honestly be denied that judges have
often exercised power that is simply unjustifiable on the terms of their
14. George, NaturalLaw, supra note 8, at 2283.
15. Fleming, supra note 1, at 2296.
16. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law- The Moral Reading of the American
Constitution 3 (1996) (emphasis added).
17. Id.
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stated theories of constitutional interpretation. In many cases,
perhaps most, their motivation is not some raw lust for power; it is,
rather, a desire to produce what they are persuaded are the right
policy outcomes in the face of what they take to be retrograde,
unenlightened, morally obtuse, or prejudiced legislators or voters.
Fleming's response, of course, is that two can play at this game. 8 So
he tries to play it. In criticizing my position, he asserts that it "reflects
political judgments about what institutions are most likely to realize
[my] particular conservative conception of natural law."' 19 Really?
Fleming's accusation that I am the one who is letting "political
judgments" color his view of the scope of judicial power under the
Constitution is amazing.
Fleming has moral views, and makes political judgments, about
contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and other controversial
issues. I do too. In notable cases our moral views and political
judgments conflict: He is a liberal; I am, as he reports, a conservative.
The depth and intensity of his liberal faith are nicely conveyed by his
story about choosing to read at his wedding ceremony from William
0. Douglas' opinion in the Griswold case. He believes that courts
should enforce liberal political judgments about contraception,

abortion, and the like.2' I say that the courts should enforce neither
his liberalpoliticaljudgments nor my conservative ones in the absence

of a warrant rooted in the text, structure, logic, or original
18. See Fleming, supra note 1, at 2296.
19. Id. at 2286 n.10.
20. Fleming insists not only that Griswold was rightly decided, but that it ought
not even to be questioned. It is, he says, a "fixed star in our constitutional
constellation" right up there with Brown v. Board of Education.Id. at 2288 (quoting
James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1995)).
Indeed, he accuses me of "obstinacy" in going "against the grain of our constitutional
practice by continuing to criticize Griswold as wrongly decided." Fleming, supra note
1, at 2288 (emphasis added). It is certainly true that liberal ideology, particularly on
questions of sexual morality and the sanctity of human life, has achieved the status of
orthodoxy in American law schools and in elite sectors of the legal profession (as
manifested, for example, in the positions officially taken and advocated by the
American Bar Association on issues pertaining to homosexuality and abortion). And
this, in turn, gives Griswold the standing of a core doctrine in something like an
established faith. Dissenters will therefore feel the chill force of what is packed into
Fleming's reference to our constitutional practice and the putative illegitimacy of any
dissent from it. Our practice is the practice of the people who are "in charge around
here," who "run the show," who have the power to decide who is included and
excluded from faculty posts and perhaps from judicial appointments, and which views
may or may not be dissented from on pain of being declared "obstinate," "out of the
mainstream," and "out of line with our constitutional practice." (I do not know
whether Fleming himself believes it would be right to deny an otherwise wellqualified candidate a judicial appointment because the candidate is "obstinate"
enough to believe that Black had the better argument in Griswold. I do know,
however, and should here point out in fairness to him, that to his great credit he has
been willing to support faculty appointments in his own law school scholars who
dissent from the liberal orthodoxy on social issues that less fair-minded scholars are
willing to enforce ruthlessly).
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understanding of the Constitution. Where no such warrant can be
identified-where the American people cannot fairly be said to have
incorporated into their fundamental law a principle that either
transfers legislative authority over a subject matter to the judiciary or
resolves the issue one way or another without the need for a judicial
foray into abstract questions of natural justice-our Constitution
leaves the matter to the deliberation and judgment of democratically
constituted and accountable legislatures at the state or national level.
That is not because the Constitution is not concerned with natural law
and natural rights; it is because that is part of the strategy of the
Constitution's framers and ratifiers for giving effect to the principles
of natural law and protecting natural rights. Now, you the reader
decide: Which one of us is allowing our view of the Constitution and
the legitimate scope of judicial power to be driven by his "political
judgments?"
Fleming may still question my motives. There is nothing I can do
about that. He may insist that in my heart of hearts the reason for my
willingness to let legislators resolve questions of public policy
pertaining to a fairly wide range of morally significant issues without
being subject to a judicial veto is a judgment on my part that
conservative views will more likely prevail with the people's
representatives than in the courts. The truth is, however, that I have
no idea whether overall and in the long run the licensing of judges to
enact into law their personal moral and political judgments under the
guise of interpreting the Constitution would conduce to the advantage
of Fleming's moral and political views or my own. Even a cursory
review of the historical record should make someone reluctant to
It all depends on
predict how things will go in the future.
One historical
unforeseeable social and political developments.
constant seems to be that judges will generally come to share elite
views where salient divisions develop between elite and popular
opinion. And, of course, today elite opinion tends to be on the liberal
side of moral and cultural issues. (Does anyone doubt that a poll of
the Princeton or Fordham faculty on "partial birth abortion" or
"same-sex marriage" will produce results rather different from a poll
of the first seven hundred names in the Trenton or Pelham telephone
book?). But it has not always been thus; nor is there any reason to
suppose that it cannot change.
Fleming suggests that I would be scandalized by the thought that "it
is a good thing for democracy for New York to decide that women
have a natural right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy
through having an abortion."2 1 While I think that pro-abortion
policies, whether put into place legislatively or by judicial action, are
unjust to their unborn victims, I am not in the least troubled by the
21. Fleming, supra note 1, at 2295.
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proposal to settle the question of abortion via the processes of
representative democracy, even in states like New York that are likely
to resolve the question in what I judge to be the wrong direction.
And, just to be clear, I do in fact think that it is proper (and even
"good for democracy") for the people and their elected
representatives to deliberate and decide matters of high moral import.
It would, in my opinion, be a mistake to remove all such matters from
the domain of ordinary democratic deliberation. At the same time, I
think it is proper for the people, upon due deliberation, to
"constitutionalize" certain matters, thus removing them from the
domain of ordinary democratic deliberation, by enshrining in the
constitutional text judicially enforceable principles of natural law and
natural rights that are incompatible with what misguided legislative
majorities might wish to do in the future.
As for abortion itself, it is clear to me that no principle to which the
American people have committed themselves in their Constitution is
incompatible with the legal protection of human beings in utero. So
Roe v. Wade' strikes me as a constitutionally unjustified decision.
Frankly, it is not so clear to me that the American people have not, by
ratification of the equal protection clause, committed themselves to a
principle that is incompatible with laws that generally permit the
killing of such human beings by abortion.2 The issue is complicated
and requires reflection on the publicly understood meaning of the
principle of equal protection that was ratified in the post-Civil War
period. If the more careful, rigorous, and historically informed
reading of the equal protection clause leads to the conclusion that the
American people have, in fact, not committed themselves to a
principle incompatible with the general legal permission of abortion,
then the matter is properly within the scope of legislative authority
and it is the responsibility of the people and their elected
representatives to resolve the issues of natural law and natural rights
at the heart of the debate about abortion justly. I do not find anything
scandalous about that. I see no reason to suppose that those of my
fellow citizens who are not Supreme Court justices are less
trustworthy on matters of moral import than are my fellow citizens
who are. Certainly nothing in the historical record inclines me to
believe that judges are better at discovering moral truth than nonjudges.
In the context of his efforts to depict my views as somehow
alienated from "the classical, interpretive justification of judicial
review,"' 4 Fleming asserts that I argue "from a conception of What is
the Constitution like Dworkin's (rather than Bork's)-through a
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. See Robert P. George, Justice, Legitimacy, and Allegiance: "The End of
Democracy?" Symposium Revisited, 44 Loy. L. Rev. 103, 110-13 (1998).
24. Fleming, supra note 1, at 2293.
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justification of judicial review that is agnostic between a conception of
What like Dworkin's and a conception of What like Bork's-to a
conclusion or conception of judicial review like Bork's (as
distinguished from Dworkin's)."' While I do not find this assertion
particularly pedantic, it is inaccurate. I agree that the question What
is the Constitution is an important one. And, like Dworkin, I believe
that the Constitution embodies principles of natural law and natural
rights. However, I further believe that the Constitution includes
various strategies for giving effect to natural law and protecting
natural rights. And unlike Dworkin (but like Bork, as I understand
his thought) I do not think that provisions such as the "equal
protection" and "due process" clauses are "abstract principles" or
"majestic generalities" whose content is to be supplied by the
unrestricted practical (moral) reasoning of judges. Where the content
or its application in particular circumstances is unclear, these
provisions are to be interpreted by reflection on their legal, historical,
and textual context, as well as on the purposes they were meant to
serve and goals they were designed to achieve. It is their legal
meaning that is the object of this particular interpretative quest.
Often, disputes about the meaning of constitutional provisions in
concrete circumstances can be resolved by such reflection, or by
consideration of the logical implications of the content of provisions
thus interpreted.
Fleming goes on to say, as if I would disagree, that "if the
Constitution embodies principles of natural law and natural rights,
[the classical, interpretive justification] entails that judges should
interpret and enforce those principles."' Of course they should. That
isn't the question. The question is Who has been given authority
under the Constitution to decide and enforce principles of natural law
and natural rights in the many cases in which the Constitution leaves
them unspecified. As I read the document, it falls to the institutions of
democratic self-government, not to the courts, to resolve them. Not
only is our Constitution not one that attempts to settle in the text
every matter of high moral import, it is not one that shifts
responsibility for every question of natural law and natural rights to
the judiciary, leaving to democratic institutions only mundane matters
of policy. I repeat: From this it does not follow that our Constitution
is not concerned wvith natural law and the protection of natural rights.
The fact is that our Constitution places a considerable measure of
responsibility for resolving disputed questions of natural law and
natural rights in the hands of the people and their elected
representatives. Again, I find nothing scandalous about that; nor
should other believers in natural law.27
25. 1& at 2294.
26. Id.
27. I am baffled by Fleming's attribution to me of the view that "judges have no
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Let me conclude with brief remarks about Professor Fleming's
treatment of Griswold (not at his wedding, but in his paper).
He argues that I am wrong to say that there was anything
"remarkable" about the first draft of Justice Douglas' opinion for the
court in the Griswold case, which would have struck down the
Connecticut statute on the basis of a First Amendment "freedom of
association" claim, rather than on a theory of privacy found in
"penumbras formed by emanations." He claims that the Supreme
Court has, in fact, since adopted an analysis in line with Douglas'
original theory in Roberts v. Jaycees."s The "penumbras formed by
emanations" metaphysics is not something that supporters of the
Griswold decision have been eager to advertise or defend. Yet the
Court itself, while citing Griswold many times, has not formally
proposed an alternative justification for the ruling. Griswold has been
categorized and treated in different ways by different justices in
different opinions. But it is, in my view, worse than a stretch for
Fleming to suggest that the opinion for the court in Roberts restores
the First Amendment "freedom of association" justification that
Douglas originally proposed as the ground for invalidating the statute
at issue in Griswold, and which his fellow justices rejected. The
original Douglas opinion has been published.29 Readers who are
curious can easily compare it with what Justice William Brennan says
in his opinion for the Court in Roberts and judge for themselves
whether my view or Fleming's is the superior one.
Fleming claims that I am also in error in saying that "Douglas'
opinion in Griswold rests on the essentially undefended assertion that
the availability of contraceptives is good for the institution of
marriage. '3° It does not presuppose any such belief, Fleming insists.
Rather, it is based on the conjunction of two different propositions
that "lead to another proposition: that it is good that the partners of

the marital association have the privacy and the freedom to make
authority to enforce natural law and natural rights against legislative encroachment."
Fleming, supra note 1, at 2287. That is not my view, nor do I assert such a thing in my
paper or anywhere else. Often, by enforcing principles fairly discoverable in the
constitutional text, its structure, logic, and original understanding, judges enforce
natural law and natural rights, as embodied in the Constitution, against legislative
encroachment.
Thus, judicial review is among the strategies by which the
Constitution gives effect to natural law and protects natural rights- though it is not
the only one. As I said in my paper, judicial review, properly practiced, "help[s] to
make the natural law ideal of constitutional government a reality." George, Natural
Law, supra note 8, at 2282. I honestly do not see how I could have made myself
clearer about this.
28. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
29. The opinion is in Bernard Schwartz, The Unpublished Opinions of the Warren
Court 231-36 (1985). Professor Schwartz, a scholar of liberal sympathies who plainly
approves of the outcome in Griswold, states that "[ilt must be conceded that the
Douglas draft Griswold opinion is not legally convincing." Id. at 237.
30. Fleming, supra note 1, at 2288.
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important decisions about whether or when to have children."31
Although Fleming does not use the word "contraception" or
"contraceptives" in the statement of his conclusion, I take him to be
stating that it is good for spouses to have contraception legally
available to them. His point against me is that this is a conclusion that
Douglas argued in support of, not an undefended assertion, which is
what I said it was.
The quick way to begin seeing that the error here is Fleming's, not
mine, is simply to ask how Griswold would and should have been
resolved had Douglas and the other justices in the majority shared the
view, adopted by the State of Connecticut in defending its statute, that
the availability of contraceptives would be damaging to the institution
of marriage. The majority justices, in fact, had to assume that the
State's view was wrong in order to reach their conclusion; yet nothing
in the Constitution can be taken to imply an answer one way or
another to the question of whether the availability of contraceptives is
good or bad for the institution of marriage.
But there is more to be said. The two propositions whose
conjunction Fleming believes generate his conclusion are the
following: (a) that "it would be destructive to the marriage
relationship if we allowed 'the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for the telltale signs of the use of contraceptives;'
and (b) that "the marriage relationship or association deserves special
protection because it is 'intimate to the degree of being sacred' and 'it
is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions."'32 Proposition (b) need not detain us. Connecticut
defended its law precisely on the basis of its judgments as to the
sources of threats to marriage and the means required to protect so
noble and important an institution. Douglas' rhetoric about marriage,
however, "stirring" Fleming may find it, does not prove that he and
those justices who joined his opinion cared more about marriage than
Connecticut's legislator's did, or that they better understood what
threatened the institution and what was needed to protect it. So the
real issue is proposition (a). The point that I want to make is that this
proposition, if it is to do any work towards generating the conclusion
Fleming wants, must itself presuppose the very proposition that he is
at pains to insist the ruling in Griswold does not presuppose, namely,
that the availability of contraceptives is good for the institution of
marriage.
The "sacred precincts of the bedroom" (or, for that matter, the
living room, bathroom, or den) are protected by the Constitution by
the Fourth Amendment's restrictions on searches. These restrictions
protect space that may be used for a wide range of activities, sexual
31. Id. at 2289.
32- Id. at 2288-89 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965)).
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and nonsexual, lawful and unlawful. They protect bedrooms and
other rooms against unreasonable searches whether, as it happens,
people are using those rooms for price fixing, bomb making,
prohibited sexual conduct, or drug use. Now, the Court has never
discovered that "penumbras formed by emanations" of the Fourth
Amendment and other constitutional guarantees create a "right to
privacy" that would entail invalidation of laws against, say, using
hallucinogens, despite the fact that people can use them in bedrooms
and can be motivated to use them precisely by a desire to heighten
sexual experience and even enhance marital intimacy, as they see it.
Why not? Indeed, why doesn't Griswold stand for such a right? The
answer is that even most judges who are willing to practice the freewheeling judicial review on display in Griswold have a different
attitude towards drug use than they have towards contraception.
Most happen not to believe that LSD, for example, is good or good
for marriage.
Most judges disagree with people who believe
otherwise. They agree with state policies prohibiting such drugs.
They find them reasonable. And they would likely be altogether
unimpressed by an invocation of Griswold's "sacred precincts"
language in the case of a couple arrested-even in their bedroom-for
possession of LSD.
On top of this, it is worth noting that the Griswold decision struck
down not only Connecticut's ban on the use of contraceptives, but on
their distribution and sale, as well. Distribution and sale were not
occurring in bedrooms. No "sacred precincts" required searching to
discover breaches of the law. Fleming's proposition (a) could be fully
complied with, even on his own terms, while enforcing key parts of the
Connecticut law that the Court invalidated in the name of "marital
privacy." The conclusion is unavoidable: It was the majority justices'
undefended moral presuppositions about contraception, and not
anything they could actually find in the Constitution's protections of
bedrooms and other private places, that accounts for their sweeping
decision.

